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in making an assessment where the line between two parishes
was indefinite and uncertain and had not been fixed on the
ground. In such a case, the line is "in dispute under the meaning of the statute," for the object of the statute was "to make
certain that the same property would not be assessed in two
'22
parishes.
DEDICATION TO PUBLIC USE

In Mecobon v. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish23 the court
applied the settled rule that intention to dedicate a plot of ground
to public use must be clearly established and found no dedication under the facts presented.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission' the court found both "warrant in law" and
"warrant in the record" for commission action ordering a railroad to permit construction of a crossing of its right of way by
public authorities. The validity of the statute2 authorizing the
commission to require such construction was upheld against an
indirect challenge to its constitutionality as a taking of private
property for public purposes without just compensation in contravention of the Constitution. 3 Argument of counsel that the
railroad held its land in perfect ownership within Article 490 of
the Civil Code and could be deprived of it only by expropriation
was rejected in favor of the principle that "[i]mplicit in the
charter and franchise of the railroad company is the implied
condition that it is granted subject to the right of the State, in
the exercise of its police power, to establish and authorize new
works necessary and subservient to the convenience and safety
of its citizens which might cause damage to the property of the
railroad. To this end, the State has the power to require of the
railroad the uncompensated duty of constructing and maintaining
22. 71 So.2d 865, 868 (La. 1954).
23. 224 La. 793, 70 So.2d 687 (1954).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 224 La. 279, 69 So.2d 43 (1953).
2. LA. R.S. 45:841 (1950).
3. LA. CONST. Art. I, § 2.
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all such crossings over its right of way as are reasonable and
'4
necessary for the public."
The court cites in support of the principle articulated in
Prosser v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company,5 a South Carolina decision. A quotation in that case from an opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan 6 furthers understanding of the foundations of the
principle:
"The company laid its tracks subject to the condition,
necessarily implied, that their use could be so regulated by
competent authority as to insure the public safety. And as
all property, whether owned by private persons or by corporations, is held subject to the authority of the State to
regulate its use in such manner as not to unnecessarily endanger the lives and the personal safety of the people, it is
not a condition of the exercise of that authority that the
State shall indemnify the owners of property for the damage
or injury resulting from its exercise. Property thus damaged
or injured is not, within the meaning of the Constitution,
taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it without
due process of law. The requirement that compensation is
made for private property taken for public use imposes no
restriction upon the inherent power of the State by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure the safety
of the people."
In effect a railroad is required to maintain its property in a safe
condition at its own cost, which includes the provision of safe,
adequate, and convenient crossings. Here, of course, the railroad
was not being required to defray the cost of constructing the
crossing but only to consent to its construction.
In sustaining the commission's decision on the fact questions
of whether the proposed crossing was unduly hazardous to the
public and would cause undue congestion and danger in the
railroad's operations, the court concluded that the decision of
the commission was not arbitrary or capricious since it could not
say that the decision "was plainly contrary to the facts or unsupported by evidence." The court cited also the long-standing
rule that a decision of an administrative body would be accorded
"great weight" and would not be disturbed in the absence of a
"clear showing of abuse of power."
4.
5.
6.
7.

224 La. 279,
216 S.C. 33,
Chicago, B.
224 La. 279,

286, 69 So.2d 43, 46 (1953).
56 S.E.2d 591 (1949).
& Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 252 (1896).
289, 69 So.2d 43, 47 (1953).
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As a result of the decision in Kansas City Southern R.R. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission," commission's General
Order Number 2, paragraph 5,9 may hereafter be read with the
bracketed insertion: "Nothing herein, or in the orders, rules and
regulations of the Railroad Commission of Louisiana as they now
exist, shall prevent the carriage, storage or handling of property
free or at reduced rates, for the [federal], state, parish, city or
town government, where the [federal], state, parish, city or town
government is the direct beneficiary of such free or reduced
rates ... "
This result is reached by the court in affirming a permanent
injunction against an order of the commission directing the
railroad to cease and desist from according the United States
Government any different treatment from that accorded other
shippers in Louisiana intrastate commerce.
The commission issued its order10 on the ground that the
railroad, in quoting a preferential rate to the United States Government, violated paragraph 4 of General Order Number 211
providing that "There shall be no unjust discrimination, undue
preference or advantage, or undue prejudice in favor of or against
any shipper, passenger or user of any of the transportation
facilities or services rendered by any common carrier or other
public service corporation subject to supervision, regulation and
control by this Commission ....
Counsel for the commission and intervening tank truck
operators argued that this provision was violated by the railroad
in quoting a preferential rate which caused undue discrimination
against other carriers. No shippers or users of the railroad's facilities were complaining of the preference, however-only tank
truck carriers who would have to reduce their rates to the
United States Government in order to stay in competition with
the railroad.
The court interpreted the commission order as not directed
to the regulation or elimination of discrimination between carriers but only to discrimination between shippers and users.
While the preferential rate quoted to the United States Government was discriminatory as against other shippers, it was a
8. 225 La. 399, 73 So.2d 188 (1954).
9. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 1 ANN. REP. 80 (1921).
10. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 32 ANN. REP. 146, Order No.
6128 (1952).
11. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 1 ANN. REP. 79, 80 (1921).
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discrimination in favor of the public and in accord with public
policy as well as the expressed policy of the commission's General
Order Number 2 exempting agencies of the public from its
12
restrictions.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
Five of the decisions at the past term are of significance to
students of state and local taxation. Two of these presented
questions relating to ad valorem taxation and the remaining
three involved corporate franchise taxation, intergovernmental
tax immunity and summary confiscation of property used in
violation of state revenue measures.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v. Ott' presented
the question whether deferred premium payments on automobile
insurance policies are "credits" within the reach of state and city
ad valorem taxation. It was shown to be the practice of the
insurance company to issue its automobile insurance policies for
periods of six months upon the payment of one-third of the
premium with the stipulation that the balance was to be paid
at the expiration of sixty days. The insurer contended that since
it reserved the right to cancel its policies at the end of the sixtyday period upon the non-payment of the balance of the premium,
the deferred payments were not in fact "credits"; or, put in
another way, it was the company's contention that it was not
extending credit under this method of doing business. The court
rejected the claim of the insurance company in a unanimous
opinion by Justice Hawthorne because "By the very terms of the
policy issued, the insurance company obligates itself to insure
for a term of six months ....-2 The right of cancellation for
non-payment of deferred premiums was regarded as immaterial
since the policy did not relieve the insured from the obligation
to pay the full amount of the premium, and thereby invested the
insurer with the right, if it chose, to compel the payment of the
deferred portion of the premium.
In Albritton v. Childers' the central issue of the case con12. Ibid.

I Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 224 La. 1008, 71 So.2d 548 (1954).
2. 224 La. 1008, 1012, 71 So.2d 548, 550 (1954).
3. 74 So.2d 156 (La. 1954).

